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Abstract
We investigate empirically the usefulness of price-cap and qual-
ity regulation in terms of allocative efficiency and welfare. An ana-
lytical framework allows us to determine sufficient conditions for an
increase in welfare. We propose Malmquist productivity indices and
their decomposition to check the conditions and to see whether it was
a better-solved trade off between quality and costs that caused the
welfare increase. The application of this method to a representative
sample of Norwegian distribution system operators yields strong evi-
dence for a positive effect of quality regulation on welfare.
Keywords: Data envelopment analysis, Malmquist-indices, alloca-
tive efficiency, quality regulation, welfare
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1 INTRODUCTION 1
1 Introduction
In the wake of major blackouts and plummeting customer satisfaction
with the quality of service in the liberalized electricity markets in
Europe, some pressing questions have arisen:
• Whether and in how far is the prevalent price-cap regulation
detrimental to quality?
• Even if quality increased - did welfare increase as well?
• Can we find evidence that it was quality regulation which in-
creased welfare?
Concerning the first question, concerns are backed by theoretical
analysis (see Sappington (2005) for example) but empirical evidence
is scarce. Kridel et al. (1996) and Sappington (2003) found mixed
impacts of different regulatory regimes on the quality of telecommu-
nication service providers1. In a recent survey, Sappington (2003) did
not draw an unequivocal conclusion about the effects of incentive reg-
ulation on the quality delivered by firms and suggests further research.
Ter-Martiroysan (2003) is the only paper that investigates electricity
distribution network providers. In a sample of 78 utilities from 23
U.S. federal states, Ter-Martiroysan finds that price-cap regulation is
associated with an increase in the average duration of outages but ex-
plicit quality benchmarks reduce this figure again.
Our second question asks if quality regulation can solve the problem.
In theory, direct incentive schemes sound useful. Sappington (2005)
puts it as follows: ”By specifying service quality targets and associ-
ated penalties and bonuses, a regulator can induce the regulated firm
to employ its superior cost information to achieve desirable levels of
service quality”. Our paper will investigate empirically, whether a
more desirable level of quality was achieved.
Since we will check these properties by means of so called cost
Malmquist indices that incorporate quality, this directly leads to
1Other studies are: Roycroft and Garcia-Murrilo (2000), Banerjee (2003), Clements
(2004) and Ai et al. (2004).
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a strand of literature that investigates the incorporation of qual-
ity into the efficiency measurement of electricity network providers:
Giannakis et al. (2005) have shown that quality is an important aspect
of the performance of electricity network operators and should be in-
corporated into a benchmark-study. However, Korhonen and Syrja¨en
(2003) were, to our knowledge, the first ones to use quality in a
benchmark-study of electricity network operators. They find improve-
ments in efficiency scores when quality of service was added. A study
that uses Malmquist-indices to compare the efficiency of electricity
distribution companies in Nordic countries has been performed by
Edvardsen and Forsund (2003). Growitsch et al. (2005) used stochas-
tic frontier analysis (SFA) for a sample of 500 European electricity
distribution companies to find that quality and quantity could form
a cost function that features increasing returns to scale in the two
output case.
To the authors best knowledge, however, the two above stated im-
portant questions concerning welfare have not yet been addressed in
the literature.
The contribution of this work is therefore to provide a method-
ology on how to investigate the effects of the introduction of quality
regulation. We determine theoretically sufficient conditions for an in-
crease in welfare and propose Malmquist indices to investigate changes
in social costs and changes in the behavior of firms. A decomposite
of Malmquist indices can be used to see whether social costs of elec-
tricity distribution really decreased because firms solved the trade-off
between costs and quality in a better way than before. Then we ap-
ply our approach to a representative sample of Norwegian electricity
distributors.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 will
present the Norwegian system of quality regulation in more detail.
Section 3 contains our methodology where we first derive the sufficient
conditions for a welfare increase in Norway due to regulation, formu-
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late corresponding hypotheses and show how they can be checked with
cost Malmquist indices and their decomposition. In section 4 our vari-
ables and our empirical model setup will be explained. This will be
followed in section 5 by an account of the main results concerning
the confirmation or rejection of our hypotheses. Finally we will make
some concluding remarks in section 6.
2 Quality Regulation - the Case of
Norway
For such a study, the focus of attention naturally shifts to Norway
as it was one of the very first countries where quality of service was
explicitly combined with a price-cap regulation regime. The liberal-
ization of the Norwegian energy sector, monitored by the Norwegian
Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) began with the in-
troduction of a new energy law in 1990. After a period of Rate-of-
Return regulation (RoR) price-cap regulation was introduced in 1997,
which was based on a benchmark-study conducted in the same year
(cf. Bundesnetzagentur, 2006).
In the regulatory period 2001 - 2006 the incentive regime was
supplemented by a system of quality regulation in which network
providers have to pay penalties for energy-not-delivered (Kinnunen,
2003). That led to a development of energy-not-supplied (ENS) in
Norway as illustrated in figure 1. The basic idea of such penalties is
to internalize the external effect of a failure of the electricity distribu-
tion system. The incentive rates in table 1 should act like a Pigouian
tax which induces firms to take the costs of the external effect into
account. If the incentive rates are set appropriately, firms choose the
trade off between costs and outages, such that the marginal costs of
an additional hour of electricity interruption and the marginal cost of
avoiding the interruption are equal2.
2Of course, different firms which face different marginal costs of providing quality would
offer different quality levels. This is why a lot of regulators (not Norway), additionally,
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Figure 1: Development of ENS (MWh) in Norway
Source: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE) -
http://www.nve.no
Setting an incentive rate does not determine whether firms will loose
or gain money. The actual transfer from or to the regulator depends
on where the allowance, or default value is set. In the Norwegian
case, the maximum allowed revenue from price cap regulation is in-
creased or decreased by the difference between the actual outage costs
a firm caused, and the allowed outage costs of the firm. Allowed
outage costs are also called expected outage costs, (which, of course,
vary from firm to firm) and are estimated by the regulator by con-
sidering outage costs of the last five years and a panel regression
(Haber and Rodgarkia-Dara, 2005). Additionally, improvements in
the expected outage costs are prescribed by the regulator.
To sum up, the level of quality supplied is set by firms by equating
marginal costs of quality provision and the incentive rate and thus
depends only on the incentive rate, whereby the distribution of pay-
ments, depends on the target level set by the regulator. The penalties
paid by firms are transferred to the regulator which is a government
introduced minimum standards to avoid having some customers of minor importance suf-
fering from too many outages even if this would be economically efficient. Thus it can be
argued that the incentive rates (which are called cost of energy not supplied in Norway),
indeed serve the purpose of efficiency, whereas minimum standards have their justification
in fairness and public good considerations.
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authority. Only in the new regulatory period which begins in 2007,
payments which have to be made by firms will be used to reduce prices
for customers.
3 Methodology
3.1 Quality Regulation and Welfare
To be able to discuss the effects at work when a quality regulation
scheme is implemented, we set up an economic framework. Welfare in
the area of each of the i = 1 . . . N local monopolists consists of gross
surplus (GSi) minus the social costs of electricity production (Ci)3.
Wi =
∫ yi
0
Pi(yi, qi) dyi︸ ︷︷ ︸
GSi(yi,qi)
−Ci(yi, qi) (1)
The inverse aggregate demand function Pi(yi, qi) in each market
depends on the quantity (yi) of the good and the long run level of
quality (qi) and is allowed to differ in the submarkets to account for
varying characteristics such as the potential market size. Demand
is downward sloping (∂Pi(·)∂yi < 0) and quantity can be interpreted as
the number of accesses to electricity4 . The level of quality qi can be
interpreted as the level of expected quality which means that it is
the quality to which potential consumers of electricity adapt to and
on which they base their decisions. Firms might set up operations
or reduce own back up production and, more generally, quality in-
creases private and commercial consumers willingness to pay so we
have ∂Pi(·)∂qi > 0.
The social costs of electricity production Ci(yi, qi) consist of the
monetary costs of electricity companies like spendings on equipment
3Possible transfer payments arising from the incentive scheme cancel out so we do not
weight consumer and producer rent differently. Preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear
such that there are no income effects.
4See for example Dro¨ttboom (1996, p. 10 f.) for a similar approach.
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and personnel and outages which are the main determinant for quality
qi.
From the questions asked in section 1, we can derive three hy-
potheses.
Hypothesis 1 After the introduction of quality regulation in Nor-
way, the social cost of electricity distribution decreased. By re-
ferring to our welfare framework (see section 3.2) this means,
that welfare increased.
Hypothesis 2 The decrease of the social costs and the increase in
quality are due to the new regulation regime in that, by charging
a price for outages, it induced electricity companies to substitute
cost for outages in a more socially favorable manner.
Hypothesis 3 Quality was too low from a welfare point of view be-
fore the introduction of quality regulation as the improvement
in quality had a positive welfare effect.
To check hypothesis 1, we first have to make sure that gross surplus
did at least not decrease. A method to verify this precondition is
presented in section 3.2. How firms and the costs they occur react to
quality regulation and how changes in social costs will be investigated,
is discussed in section 3.4. Cost Malmquist productivity indices are
then used to check whether social costs of electricity production really
decreased. Decompositions of such Malmquist indices are then used
to see whether hypothesis 2 is justified which is explained in section
3.3.
A corollary is that if welfare really increased due to a better mix
of outages and costs, it cannot have been optimal in the pure price
cap regime before.
3.2 Gross Welfare
A precondition for a welfare increase due to quality regulation is that
gross welfare did at least not decrease. Analytically, the change in
gross surplus can be depicted by the total differential
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dGSi =
∂GSi(yi, qi)
∂yi
dyi +
∂GSi(yi, qi)
∂qi
dqi (2)
Assuming that the change in dGSi(y, q) must be nonnegative and
rearranging yields the following condition.
dyi
dqi
≥ −
∂GSi(yi,qi)
∂qi
∂GSi(yi,qi)
∂yi
(3)
The right part of (3) is the slope of the isowelfare curve at a cer-
tain point in a (yi, qi) diagram, whereby the left part gives the slope
or direction in which the new quality - quantity combination on the
market has moved. Following from the above-mentioned assumptions,
gross surplus GSi(yi, qi) increases in yi and qi which means that the
right hand side of (3) is always negative. Figure 2 can be used to inter-
pret this condition graphically. If yi and qi both increase, one moves
into the north east direction and welfare increases unambigously. If yi
increases and qi decreases, one moves to the south east and the slope
of the change (dyidqi ) must be less negative than the slope of the isow-
elfare curve for welfare to increase. If yi decreases and qi increases,
the graphical interpretation can be understood more easily if (3) is
multiplied by -1.
We now try come to a crude judement whether condition (3) holds
for our sample of Norwegian submarkets. To do so, we first compute
the derivatives.
dyi
dqi
≥
∫ yi
0
∂Pi(yi,qi)
∂qi
dyi
Pi(yi, qi)
(4)
The left hand side of (4) is still the same as before. The denomi-
nator on the right hand side of (4) is Pi(yi, qi) so we use the price of
accesses to the electricity network in 2001 to approximate that. For
the numerator we use the average outage costs, weighted by market
quantities in 2001. This gives us a crude measure of the slope of the
isowelfare curve which can then be compared the slope of dyidqi . The
results are shown in table 4, in the appendix. It can be seen that our
precondition for a welfare increase seems to hold for our representative
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Figure 2: Graphical interpretation of (3)
Source: own calculations
sample of norwegian firms.
3.3 Malmquist Indices and their Decomposi-
tion5
3.3.1 The Cost Malmquist (CM) Productivity Index
The general aim of Malmquist indices is to measure productivity
changes and to determine its reasons by decomposing it into its main
sources. Malmquist indices have been used in a wide range of appli-
cations and been extended in many ways (for an overview see e. g.
Faere et al., 1998). In order to answer our above questions we have to
find out how the productivity of the firms changed in terms of costs.
We will therefore adopt the approach of Maniadakis and Thanassoulis
(2004) who define a cost Malmquist (CM) productivity index and de-
compose it in such a way as to be able to identify changes in allocative
and technical efficiency, in the technology of production and in input
prices. The CM index is the geometric mean of the CM index of
5This section is largely based on Maniadakis and Thanassoulis (2004).
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periods t and t + 1 and looks as follows:
CM =
[
wtxt+1/Ct(yt+1, wt)
wtxt/Ct(yt, wt)
∗ w
t+1xt+1/Ct+1(yt+1, xt+1)
wt+1xt/Ct+1(yt, xt+1)
]1/2
(5)
where wtxt ≡∑Nn=1wtnxtn and n denotes the n-th input and Ct(yt, wt)
is a standard cost function, defined as the minimum cost required
to produce output yt with prices wt and with a constant returns to
scale technology in period t. The cost ratio wtxt/Ct(yt, wt) measures
the extent to which aggregate production costs in period t could be
reduced, while still producing output yt with the price vector wt, so
it measures overall efficiency in period t. The rest of the cost ratios
are defined analogously.
CM index values smaller than 1 identify productivity progress (less
costs for a given output), values greater than 1 indicate regress and a
value of 1 means constant productivity. As will be explained in more
detail in section 3.4, we will use this index to check our hypothesis 1.
3.3.2 The decomposition of the CM index
To be able to disentangle the various possible sources of the change in
efficiency, the CM Index can be decomposed into two subcomponents,
which can themselves be split into two components each as illustrated
in figure 3.
Equation (5) can be rewritten as in (6), such that we get an expression
for the so called overall efficiency change (OEC) and the so called cost
technical change (CTC):
CM =
wt+1xt+1/Ct+1(yt+1, wt+1)
wtxt/Ct(yt, wt)
∗
[
wtxt+1/Ct(yt+1, wt)
wt+1xt+1/Ct+1(yt+1, wt+1)
× w
txt/Ct(yt, wt)
wt+1xt/Ct+1(yt, wt+1)
]1/2
(6)
The term outside the brackets is the overall efficiency change (OEC),
it tells us by how much the firm managed to move closer to the mini-
mum cost line at the respective prevailing relative prices (“catch up”).
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Figure 3: The decomposition of efficiency changes
The term inside the brackets, CTC, measures the cost boundary shift
due to the combined effects of technical progress and price effects.
The two parts can be decomposed further: First, we can divide the
catch up factor (OEC) into the technical efficiency change (TEC) and
allocative efficiency change (AEC):
OEC =
Dt+1i (y
t+1, xt+1)
Dti(yt, xt)
∗ w
t+1xt+1/(Ct+1(yt+1, wt+1)Dt+1i (y
t+1, xt+1))
wtxt/(Ct(yt, wt)Dti(yt, xt))
(7)
Where Dti(y
t, xt) is the input distance function that gives the largest
factor by which the input levels in xt can be divided while xt remains in
the input requirement set Lt(yt) = {xt : xt can produce yt}. Dti(yt, xt)
is therefore defined as
Dti(y
t, xt) = sup
θ
{θ : (xt/θ) ∈ Lt(yt), θ > 0}
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and Dt+1i analogously (The i stands for “input orientation”).
The first component of (7), (TEC), can also be called the technical
catch up factor and measures by how much a firm came closer to
the isoquant. The second term in (7) is allocative efficiency change
(AEC) and indicates the extend to which the firm “catches up” with
the optimal input mix regarding the input prices in each period.
Analogously, (CTC) can be decomposed into a part that accounts for
shifts in the isoquant (TC) and a part that measures the effect of
relative input prices (PE)6. :
CTC = TC · PE (8)
The technical change component (TC) is the same as the technical
change component of a standard Malmquist-index as used for example
in Giannakis et al. (2005) and measures by how much the change in
productivity of firms can be attributed to technical progress (a shift of
the isoquant). The residual part (PE) measures the impact of relative
input price changes on changes of minimum costs.
As with the CM index, with all the discussed indices an index value of
less than 1 identifies an improvement of the firm, a value greater than
1 indicates deterioration and a value of 1 means stagnation. It will be
explained in section 3.4 how the CTC, OEC, TEC, AEC, PE and
TC indices can be used to check hypothesis 2.
3.3.3 Computation of the Indices and their Compo-
nents
As could be seen in the previous section, the decisive components
of the various indices are the input distance functions Dti(y
t, xt) and
the cost functions Ct(yt, wt). These measures are crucially dependent
on a definition of the production possibility set (PPS) and the cor-
responding isoquants. A widely used and practical approach to get
a workable estimation of the PPS is the mathematical programming
based method Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Other so called
6The exact formulation of the decomposition follows similar lines as above and is there-
fore not given in detail here.
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parametric approaches which are based on estimating econometrically
or by means of mathematical programming a hypothesized parametric
form of the production function or cost boundary are also possible but
not elaborated here. The basic idea behind DEA is to estimate the
PPS by laying a convex hull around the empirically available input-
output combinations of the different players in the sample. The DEA-
methodology can be used to compute the CM index as follows:
Suppose that in each time period t, there are j = 1, ..., J produc-
tion units which produce m = 1...M outputs ytkm by using n = 1...N
inputs xtkn at prices w
t
kn. For unit k the cost denoted by w
txt is
wtxt ≡ ∑Nn=1wtnxtn. The costs denoted by wt+1n xt+1n , wt+1n xtn and
wtnx
t+1
n are defined analogously. For unit k, the term C
t(yt, wt) can
be computed by solving the following linear program:
Ct(yt, wt) =min
x,z
wtknxn (9)
s.t.
J∑
j=1
zjy
t
jm ≥ ytkm
J∑
j=1
zjx
t
jn ≤ xtn
zj ≥ 0, xn ≥ 0
where zj is an intensity variable used to form convex combinations of
observed inputs and outputs.
The terms Ct(yt+1, wt), Ct+1(yy+1, wt+1) and Ct+1(yt, wt+1) can thus
be computed by using the different combinations of prices, technolo-
gies and quantities of periods t and tt+1. In order to get the values
for the distance function Dti(y
t, xt) the following program, as concep-
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tualized by Faere et al. (1989), has to be solved:
[
Dti(y
t, wt)
]−1 =min
θ,z
θ (10)
s.t.
J∑
j=1
zjy
t
jm ≥ ytkm
J∑
j=1
zjx
t
jn ≤ θxtkn
zj ≥ 0
Dti(y
t+1, xt+1), Dt+1i (y
t+1, xt+1) and Dt+1i (y
t, xt) can be derived with
the same model after having adjusted the time periods t and t + 1
accordingly.
With the CM index, its decomposition and the models to calculate
all these indices from empirical data we have the necessary tools to
check the hypotheses from section 3.1 as will be shown below.
3.4 Quality Regulation and the Firm
The main idea of quality regulation is to let the network operators
bear the social (or external) cost of outages by charging a price for
them. In what follows, we will first show how this measure affects the
behavior of a cost minimizing firm, before we turn to explaining how
this behavioral change can be measured by the above indices and thus
how we can check our hypotheses.
The cost minimization problem of the firm looks as follows:
min
x≥0
wx (11)
s.t. : f(x) ≥ ŷ
Where w is the vector of input prices, x is the vector of inputs, ŷ
is a given level of output and f(x) is the chosen level of output. The
input vector x′ = (x1, o) ∈ R+ consists of the monetary input total
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expenditures x1 and the physical input outages o. Outages are an
undesired output of the firm and will thus be our first input variable
like in Yaisawarng and Klein (1994)7. As the other input we consider
is the monetary input total expenditures (TOTEX), we are not able
to measure any misallocation between capital expenditures (CAPEX)
and operating expenditures (OPEX) (Averch and Johnson, 1962, cf.)
8. With our choice of inputs, we thus model the trade-off of the firm:
Either produce with low costs and high outages, or with high costs
and low outages. Figure 4 shall illustrate this situation of the industry.
Figure 4: The situation of the industry before and after the introduction of
quality regulation
The black rings mark the input combinations of the different firms in
the sample at given output and the dashed line shows the minimum
cost line that results without regulation, that is, when a price of zero
7There is an extensive literature on how to treat undesired outputs in DEA, for a an
overview, see for example Dyckhoff and Allen (2001).
8This approach is justified in our Norwegian case as price-cap regulation, which should
lead to a right allocation between capital and other inputs had already been in place for
some time before quality regulation was implemented so we can safely assume that firms
have allocated all the other inputs in a cost minimizing manner.
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is charged for outages9. Due to the location of the minimum cost line
we conjecture, in accordance with our hypotheses, that the bulk of
firms will have an input mix with relatively high outages and rela-
tively low TOTEX. When a price for outages is introduced, the price
line pivots and the cost minimizing point moves to the north west. As
a consequence, according to our hypotheses again, most firms will have
higher costs of production and will strive to reduce them by moving
north west as well by adapting their input mix accordingly10. In other
words, they want to achieve that their the expenditures for their new
input mix at the new prices (the social costs of outages were actually
always there) are lower than the expenditures for their old input mix
valued at the new prices, i. e. w1x2001 < w1x2005 (whether the firms
were successful in this can be measured by the CM index).
It is clear then that by introducing a price for quality, the cost mini-
mization problem of the firm becomes equal to social cost minimiza-
tion. If we detect a movement as shown in figure 4 in our sample, this
confirms our hypotheses that it was the new regulation, that induced
firms to behave in a more welfare optimal way.
We now show how our indices can be used to detect and analyse such
a movement. To that end, consider figure 5, which illustrates the sit-
uation of a firm (black rings) that moves from point Bt in period t in
direction north west to point Ct+1 in period t+1. Here, the isoquant
results from the DEA-methodology as the piecewise linear convex hull
around the firms in the sample that show the least inputs at given
output. The minimum cost line is the result of the program in (9)
when the new price for quality is already in place. For illustrative
purposes, it is assumed here that there was no technological change
between t and t + 1 (so that the isoquant didn’t move) and no price
change (so that the minimum cost line didn’t move).
9Please note that due to our empirical approach and the corresponding DEA-
methodology, firms can be situated off the isoquant which is not standard in microeconomic
theory. We shall refer to Faere et al. (1998) for an overview of the literature that deals
with this feature of DEA.
10In the graph it is assumed that firms have no cost of outages at all, before the intro-
duction of the regulatory regime. In reality firms would, of course, consider lost turnover
and lost willingness to pay as quality deteriorates. Additionally, incentives to provide
quality change due to vertical structures as investigated by Buehler et al. (2004).
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Figure 5: Malmquist indices and welfare changes
The CM index, expressed in Euclidean distances, is the ratio
(OC/OG)/(OB/OE) and thus smaller than one. In other words, the
firm has decreased its producer cost so that hypothesis 1 can be con-
firmed here.
Moreover, by moving from Bt to Ct+1, the firm improves its alloca-
tive efficiency which is given by the ratios OE/OD and OG/OF in
period t and t+1 respectively. In the case illustrated, the firm moves
parallel to the isoquant, which itself did not change, so there was nei-
ther a change in technical efficiency, nor technical progress (TC and
TEC would be close to one). As input prices did not change either,
PE would be equal to one as well. As a consequence, the AEC in-
dex which measures cost decreases due to changes in the input mix
is smaller than 1. In other words, if the substitution of TOTEX for
outages leads to an increase in allocative efficiency and thus a decrease
in social costs, we see it in the AEC index11.
11Apart from seeing the effect in the AEC measure, technological progress could also
indicate the effect of a quality scheme. This is due to the fact that our frontier is estimated
empirically which means it is defined by what firms actually do. By trying to improve
quality, the best firms would probably push the isoquant inward as well.
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Putting it together, the decisive indices for testing our hypothesis are
the CM and the AEC index: If their calculated values are smaller
than 1 we can confirm our 2 hypotheses for the individual firm. In the
aggregate, we can confirm them if the following conditions hold:
N∑
i=1
Social Costi,2001 ∗ CMi
/
Social Cost2001 < 1 (12)
and
N∑
i=1
(Social Costi,2001 ∗AECi)/Social Cost2001 < 1 (13)
Where Social Costi,t = TOTEXi,t+po t∗oi,t. Equation 12 therefore
gives the total relative change of social costs and 13 gives the relative
change of social costs because of better allocative efficiency.
4 Data and Choice of Variables
4.1 Choice of Variables and Model Setup
To account for different aspects of the performance of a network
provider, we use three different outputs, namely the amount of en-
ergy delivered over the network (MWh), the number of customers and
network length. Using the network length is not undisputed as a firm
could theoretically add network length and thereby increase its output.
In our case however, it is crucial to measure geographical dispersion
of customers. Moreover, our choice of output variables largely follows
Forsund and Kittelsen (1998) and Edvardsen and Forsund (2003),
who assessed the development of productivity of Scandinavian elec-
tricity distribution firms. Our choice is also consistent with the results
of Korhonen and Syrja¨en (2003) who investigated the appropriateness
of different inputs and outputs in great detail. As mentioned above,
two inputs, namely total expenditures (TOTEX) and ENS (i.e. out-
ages), were used, the first one in monetary terms as in Giannakis et al.
(2005). In order to be able to measure allocative efficiency concerning
these 2 inputs we treat TOTEX as a nummeraire such that its price
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equals 1 and use the actual price for energy-not-supplied as estimated
by the regulator. This way we get a price-ratio between these two
inputs which is necessary for further calculations as described above.
4.2 Dataset
We used cost and output data of the fifty largest Norwegian distribu-
tion system operators, published by the Norwegian Water Resources
and Energy Directorate (NVE). After having eliminated units with
insufficient data quality, 31 DMUs (decision making units) were used
for the calculation of our indices which we did for the periods 1999-
2001, 1999-2005 and most importantly 2001-2005.
TOTEX consist of operating expenditures (OPEX) and capital ex-
penditures (CAPEX). Our operating expenditures (OPEX) com-
prise costs for network losses, wages and other costs. Following
Korhonen and Syrja¨en (2003) costs for transmission services were not
included, as they are beyond the control of a single unit. Our capital
expenditures (CAPEX) consist of depreciation plus the value of the
assets multiplied with the so called fair rate of return. The fair rate
of return is set by the regulator and serves as a reasonable approxi-
mation of the actual financing costs of a firm. According to Grasto
(1997) and Kinnunen (2003), the fair rate of return which is used in
Norway is the return of a medium term government bond (risk free
rate) plus a two percent risk premium, whereby debt and equity are
treated equally. The rate of return a regulator grants can be assumed
to be a reasonable approximation of the actual financing costs a firm
faces.
As already mentioned in the previous section, the second input is
energy-not-supplied (ENS) which measures the amount of energy (in
MWh) which could not be delivered due to failures of the distribution
system. To be more precise, ENS measures how much energy cus-
tomers would have used, if there had been no failure by considering
the typical load curve of customers and the time of the outage. The
development of the sum of ENS is shown in figure 1.
We did not account for regional differences in factor costs, as our
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Customer Group Non - notified Notified
Industrial 8.25 5.75
Trade and Service 12.38 8.5
Agricultural 1.88 1.25
Residential 1 0.88
Public Service 1.63 1.25
Wood processing/energy intensive industries 1.63 1.38
Weighted average (by electricity consumption) 6.74
Table 1: Outage Costs
source: Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate, in EUROs
sample of firms is very homogeneous. Moreover, the NVE already
harmonized the data extensively for their own benchmark studies.
In order to be able to consider allocative questions, we need an esti-
mate of outage costs, that is, the po in the above formulas. The cost
of energy not supplied (CENS) per MWh as investigated by the Nor-
wegian regulatory authority are given in Table 1. To get a price for
ENS, we calculated the average of the outage costs of different groups,
weighted by their electricity consumption. This value now represents
the expected cost of an outage which occurs at any customer. This po
was then discounted or inflated with the Norwegian rate of inflation
to get measures for the different years.
5 Results12
The most important results of our investigation can be inferred from
table 2 as it shows the aggregation of the individual results from the
comparison 2001-2005 in order to check whether equations (12) and
(13) hold (the other results can be found in the sections B.1, B.2 and
B.3). It can be seen, that for most of the the single firms AEC and
CM are smaller than one. In line ”relative change” it can be seen
that total social cost of electricity production decreased, mainly due
to increases in allocative efficiency. So our hypotheses from section
12For calculating the LP-problems and the indices we used the free software package R.
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SC01 SC01
Firm Social Cost01 CM01.05 AEC01.05 ∗CM01.05 ∗AEC01.05
Alta Kraftlag AL 44220.84 0.83 1.05 36787.17 46299.28
Askoy Energi AS 27551.58 0.93 0.91 25641.46 25006.04
Bodo Energi AS 67827.65 1.13 0.98 76682.51 66223.13
Dalane energi IKS 53692.56 0.87 1.03 46665.46 55362.33
Eidefoss AS 49425.57 0.94 0.90 46398.87 44539.30
Elverum Energiverk Nett AS 53276.37 0.79 1.03 41856.29 54910.06
Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS 102831.98 0.72 0.98 73811.76 100439.45
Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 34689.11 1.21 1.02 41998.98 35290.91
Hadeland Energinett AS 65040.86 0.95 0.96 61518.20 62127.48
Hallingdal Kraftnett AS 53536.23 0.86 0.94 45933.75 50474.03
Halogaland Kraft AS 81103.98 0.89 1.01 71897.48 81897.30
Hammerfest Elverk Nett AS 34100.64 1.14 0.99 38855.53 33850.44
Haugaland Kraft AS 117702.97 1.48 1.00 174280.35 118032.46
HelgelandsKraft AS 237660.94 0.89 0.96 211886.07 227212.27
Klepp Energi AS 20754.11 1.00 1.16 20730.28 24105.33
Lier everk AS 33650.95 0.86 1.00 28790.03 33650.95
Lofotkraft AS 66079.09 0.84 1.03 55611.33 67871.22
Narvik Energinett AS 47740.15 1.13 0.98 54094.95 46613.29
Nordmore Energiverk AS 78536.33 1.06 0.84 82864.44 65582.71
Nord-Osterdal Kraftlag AL 34652.66 1.10 1.06 38279.52 36561.66
Notodden Energi AS 29043.99 0.92 0.92 26788.70 26705.01
Ringeriks-Kraft Nett AS 63172.29 1.22 0.94 77133.41 59207.35
Stange Energi Nett AS 41932.45 0.88 0.87 36722.62 36334.35
Sunnfjord Energi AS 54999.81 0.82 1.09 45188.20 60144.48
Tafjord Kraftnett AS 111933.04 0.98 0.99 109150.43 110612.91
Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 210732.13 0.66 0.94 138236.61 198230.62
Tussa Nett AS 122701.19 1.04 1.09 128210.26 134109.28
Valdres Energiverk AS 62752.93 0.81 0.97 51055.27 60692.06
Varanger Kraftnett AS 53137.19 1.45 1.00 77262.72 53254.12
Vesteralskraft Nett AS 50440.64 1.13 0.96 57162.44 48565.21
Sum 2104920.25 2021495.09 2063905.03
relative change 0.96 0.98
Table 2: The aggregation of Malmquist indices (2001-2005)
3.1 can be confirmed: Quality regulation indeed induced companies
to choose a more socially favorable input mix, thereby decrease their
costs of production and thus to increase welfare.
When looking at the geometric average of the results in table 3 (the
detailed results can be found in appendices B.1 and B.3), we can,
moreover, diagnose a few other things: The CM is smaller than one
in all three comparisons: Between 1999 and 2005 social cost efficiency
increased by almost 8 percent which cannot be attributed to technical
progress as this figure even shows a slight regress (TC = 1.02). Also,
the technical catch up factor TEC shows only a three percent increase
in efficiency.
Comparing the development of AEC before and after 2001 we observe
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CM
OEC CTC
CM IM * TEC* AEC TC* PE
1999 - 2001
Geometric average 0.9595 1.0343 0.9538 0.9527 1.0844 0.9738
Standard deviation 0.2076 0.1523 0.1147 0.1568 0.0588 0.0632
Min 0.5292 0.6628 0.7228 0.6148 0.8625 0.8738
Max 1.5619 1.3030 1.2002 1.3625 1.1561 1.1991
2001 - 2005
Geometric average 0.9669 0.9673 1.0180 0.9805 0.9502 1.0163
Standard deviation 0.1940 0.2186 0.2295 0.0681 0.1218 0.0664
Min 0.6560 0.6637 0.7032 0.8351 0.6637 0.8657
Max 1.4807 1.4797 1.5613 1.1615 1.1246 1.2413
1999 - 2005
Geometric average 0.9266 0.9989 0.9710 0.9370 1.0287 0.9900
Standard deviation 0.2739 0.2789 0.2480 0.1506 0.1367 0.0945
Min 0.4841 0.4930 0.5718 0.5580 0.7447 0.7519
Max 1.6352 1.6263 1.5613 1.4049 1.2247 1.3439
*
IM = TEC ∗ TC
Table 3: Summary of the main developments
that the bigger part of the advancement was made before 2001. The
larger increase in AEC-efficiency in the first period can be partly ex-
plained by the methodology we have used. To see why, consider figure
5 again and note that an input-mix change has a much stronger effect
on the change in allocative efficiency if the firm is originally located
further in the south eastern part of the graph. After 2001, AEC was
the second largest source of productivity progress and there occurred
a frontier shift (TC). Therefore firms moved the estimated frontier
outward by either reducing quality slacks or by investing in technology
to produce less outages at lower costs.
An alternative way to interpret the results is by remembering that
OEC measures the amount by which firms came closer to the price
line. In the period 1999-2001 decreases in OEC can be attributed
equally to technical catch up (TEC) and changes in the input mix
(AEC). After the introduction of quality regulation, however, changes
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in the input mix, were the only driving force with the increase of OEC-
efficiency (i.e. only (AEC) was below 1, whereas TEC was above 1).
Apart from the effect of quality regulation there are other interesting
observations to be made as well. Between 1999 and 2001, efficiency
mainly increased because firms converged to the efficiency frontier.
This could be due to the recently (1997) introduced price cap regu-
lation which is supposed to promote convergence in efficiency. After
2001 technical progress was again the driving force in efficiency.
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6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to investigate empirically the usefulness of
price-cap and quality regulation, not only in terms of changes in qual-
ity, but in terms of allocative efficiency and welfare.
We develop a methodology on how to address the issue. An analyt-
ical framework allows us to determine sufficient conditions for a weak
increase in gross welfare and a decrease in the social cost of electricity
distribution. If both conditions are satisfied, welfare indeed increased.
In order to investigate changes in social costs and reasons for such
changes we propose Malmquist productivity indices. The next ques-
tion is to what extend can a potential such welfare increase actually
be attributed to quality regulation? This is the case if a substan-
tial part of the increase in welfare (the decrease in social costs) can
be attributed to a better-solved trade off between production costs
and quality that is, higher allocative efficiency. In other words: If,
by charging a price for outages, electricity companies were induced
to substitute costs for outages in a more socially favorable manner.
Whether this was the case or not, can be measured by a decomposite
of the Malmquist Index.
Malmquist indices were then calculated for a representative sample
of Norwegian distribution system operators. We found strong evidence
that it was indeed quality regulation that induced firms to behave in
a socially more optimal way. As the social costs of electricity distri-
bution decreased and our condition for a weak welfare increase seems
to hold it can be argued that welfare increased. A corollary result is
that with the prior pure price cap regulation regime quality cannot
have been optimal, since otherwise welfare would not have increased
with increasing absolute quality levels.
Our results have implications for regulatory policy. If quality can
be observed and contractually specified, it might well be worthwhile
to directly regulate it even if regulation is costly as suggested by
Buehler et al. (2006) and Burger (2008)
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A Gross Welfare
Firm dyi dqi
dyi
dqi
∫ yi
0
∂Pi(yi,qi)
∂qi
dyi
Pi(yi,qi)
condition satisfied?
Alta Kraftlag AL -222.00 24.67 -9.00 -240.93 j
Askøy Energi AS 863.00 -1.81 -477.17 -229.39 n
Bodø Energi AS 701.00 -56.41 -12.43 -532.51 j
Dalane Elverk 622.00 11.75 52.93 -258.01 j
Eidefoss AS 4.00 -10.15 -0.39 -283.87 j
Elverum Energiverk Nett AS 35.00 212.03 0.17 -226.55 j
Fredrikstad Energi Nett AS -549.00 -239.88 n
Gudbrandsdal Energi AS 1076.00 -26.26 -40.97 -306.03 j
Hadeland Energinett AS 212.00 71.98 2.95 -337.00 j
Hallingdal Kraftnett AS 1180.00 59.80 19.73 -401.45 j
H˚alogaland Kraft AS 1484.00 4.06 365.25 -495.58 j
Hammerfest Elverk Nett AS 274.00 -45.01 -6.09 -158.40 j
Haugaland Kraft AS 2076.00 -58.97 -35.20 -1164.13 j
HelgelandsKraft AS 1847.00 238.99 7.73 -978.07 j
Klepp Energi AS 470.00 0.56 838.07 -129.16 j
Lier everk AS 1571.00 0.94 1678.33 -233.62 j
Lofotkraft AS 1015.00 28.83 35.20 -323.14 j
Narvik Energi AS 292.00 26.32 11.09 -259.52 j
Nordmøre Energiverk 929.00 -48.01 -19.35 -535.41 j
Nord-Østerdal Kraftlag Andelsverk AS 227.00 63.05 3.60 -225.28 j
Notodden Energi AS 158.00 -23.19 -6.81 -160.48 j
Ringeriks-Kraft AS -576.00 55.45 -10.39 -432.08 j
Stange Energi AS 491.00 102.93 4.77 -212.82 j
Sunnfjord Energi AS -123.00 43.19 -2.85 -318.58 j
Tafjord Kraftnett AS 935.00 19.08 49.01 -621.93 j
Trondheim Energiverk Nett AS 5853.00 62.73 93.30 -1937.78 j
Tussa Nett AS 175.00 60.17 2.91 -587.17 j
Valdres Energiverk AS 1080.00 52.64 20.52 -239.10 j
Varanger Kraft AS -303.00 -69.77 4.34 -356.30 j
Vester˚alskraft Nett AS 997.00 48.69 20.47 -262.91 j
Table 4: testing the condition for an increase in gross welfare
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B Malmquist-Indices
B.1 1999 to 2001
1999 - 2001 CM OEC CTC TEC AEC TC PE IM
Alta.Kraftlag.AL 0.91 0.87 1.04 0.99 0.88 1.06 0.99 1.04
Askoy.Energi.AS 0.53 0.51 1.04 0.83 0.61 1.12 0.93 0.93
Bodo.Energi.AS 0.87 0.82 1.05 0.89 0.93 1.08 0.98 0.96
Dalane.Elverk 1.02 0.98 1.03 0.72 1.36 0.97 1.07 0.7
Eidefoss.AS 1.1 1 1.1 1.04 0.96 1.09 1.01 1.14
Elverum.Energiverk.Nett.AS 0.99 0.95 1.05 0.97 0.97 1.15 0.91 1.11
Fredrikstad.Energi.Nett.AS 0.86 0.8 1.07 0.75 1.07 1.07 1 0.81
Gudbrandsdal.Energi.AS 1.08 1 1.08 1 1 1.05 1.03 1.05
Hadeland.Energinett.AS 1.05 1 1.06 1.05 0.95 1.16 0.91 1.21
Hallingdal.Kraftnett.AS 1.3 1.2 1.08 1.13 1.06 1.13 0.96 1.28
Halogaland.Kraft.AS 0.93 0.87 1.06 0.92 0.95 1.09 0.97 1
Hammerfest.E.verk.DA 0.61 0.6 1.03 0.87 0.69 1.13 0.91 0.99
Haugaland.Kraft.AS 1.05 1 1.05 1 1 1.11 0.94 1.11
Helgeland.Kraftlag.AL 1.1 1.01 1.08 1 1.02 1.14 0.95 1.14
Klepp.Energi.AS 0.96 1 0.96 1 1 1.1 0.87 1.1
Lier.everk.AS 0.94 0.98 0.95 1 0.98 1.05 0.91 1.05
Lofotkraft.AS 0.76 0.7 1.09 1.01 0.69 1.12 0.98 1.13
Narvik.Energi.AS 0.85 0.81 1.05 1 0.81 1.12 0.94 1.12
Nordmore.Energiverk 1.01 0.95 1.07 0.78 1.21 1.09 0.98 0.85
Nord.Osterdal.Kraftlag.AL 1.02 0.94 1.09 1 0.94 1.01 1.08 1.01
Notodden.Energi.AS 0.77 0.74 1.03 0.77 0.96 0.86 1.2 0.66
Ringeriks.Kraft.AS 1.35 1.26 1.07 1.18 1.07 1.11 0.97 1.3
Stange.Energi.AS 1.56 1.47 1.06 1.2 1.22 1.08 0.99 1.29
Sunnfjord.Energi.AS 0.85 0.78 1.1 1 0.77 1.09 1 1.1
Tafjord.Kraftnett.AS 0.95 0.9 1.05 0.94 0.96 1.08 0.97 1.02
Trondheim.Energiverk.Nett.AS 1.15 1.06 1.09 1 1.06 1.06 1.02 1.06
Tussa.Nett.AS 0.79 0.75 1.06 0.84 0.89 1.07 0.99 0.91
Valdres.Energiverk.AS 1.18 1.08 1.09 0.99 1.1 1.13 0.97 1.12
Varanger.Kraft.AS 0.88 0.86 1.03 1 0.86 1.12 0.92 1.12
Vesteralskraft.Nett.AS 1.01 0.93 1.08 0.95 0.98 1.15 0.94 1.08
Mgeom 0.96 0.91 1.06 0.95 0.95 1.08 0.97 1.03
Mavrg 0.98 0.93 1.06 0.96 0.97 1.09 0.98 1.04
SD 0.21 0.19 0.04 0.11 0.16 0.06 0.06 20.96
Min 0.53 0.51 0.95 0.72 0.61 0.86 0.87 0.99
Max 1.56 1.47 1.1 1.2 1.36 1.16 1.2 0.96
Table 5: Malmquist-indices for the period 1999 to 2001
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B.2 2001 to 2005
2001 - 2005 CM OEC CTC TEC AEC TC PE IM
Alta.Kraftlag.AL 0.83 0.74 1.13 0.7 1.05 1.02 1.11 0.72
Askoy.Energi.AS 0.93 1.1 0.84 1.21 0.91 0.78 1.08 0.95
Bodo.Energi.AS 1.13 1.52 0.75 1.55 0.98 0.75 0.99 1.17
Dalane.Elverk 0.87 0.82 1.07 0.79 1.03 0.86 1.24 0.68
Eidefoss.AS 0.94 0.9 1.04 1 0.9 1.01 1.03 1.01
Elverum.Energiverk.Nett.AS 0.79 0.78 1.01 0.76 1.03 0.94 1.08 0.71
Fredrikstad.Energi.Nett.AS 0.72 0.9 0.79 0.92 0.98 0.72 1.1 0.67
Gudbrandsdal.Energi.AS 1.21 1.1 1.1 1.08 1.02 1.11 0.99 1.2
Hadeland.Energinett.AS 0.95 0.93 1.01 0.98 0.96 1.02 0.99 1
Hallingdal.Kraftnett.AS 0.86 0.83 1.03 0.88 0.94 1.03 1 0.91
Halogaland.Kraft.AS 0.89 0.82 1.08 0.81 1.01 1.09 1 0.88
Hammerfest.Elektrisitetsverk.DA 1.14 1.12 1.02 1.13 0.99 1.01 1 1.14
Haugaland.Kraft.AS 1.48 1.57 0.95 1.56 1 0.93 1.01 1.46
Helgeland.Kraftlag.AL 0.89 0.86 1.04 0.9 0.96 1.05 0.99 0.94
Klepp.Energi.AS 1 1.16 0.86 1 1.16 0.99 0.87 0.99
Lier.everk.AS 0.86 1 0.86 1 1 0.88 0.97 0.88
Lofotkraft.AS 0.84 0.79 1.06 0.77 1.03 1.08 0.98 0.83
Narvik.Energi.AS 1.13 1.36 0.83 1.4 0.98 0.84 0.99 1.17
Nordmore.Energiverk 1.06 1.06 0.99 1.27 0.84 0.93 1.06 1.19
Nord.Osterdal.Kraftlag.AL 1.1 1.07 1.04 1.01 1.06 1.09 0.95 1.1
Notodden.Energi.AS 0.92 0.99 0.93 1.08 0.92 1 0.94 1.07
Ringeriks.Kraft.AS 1.22 1.17 1.04 1.25 0.94 1.03 1.01 1.29
Stange.Energi.AS 0.88 0.9 0.97 1.04 0.87 0.99 0.98 1.03
Sunnfjord.Energi.AS 0.82 0.78 1.05 0.72 1.09 1.05 1 0.75
Tafjord.Kraftnett.AS 0.98 1.17 0.84 1.18 0.99 0.78 1.07 0.92
Trondheim.Energiverk.Nett.AS 0.66 0.94 0.7 1 0.94 0.66 1.05 0.66
Tussa.Nett.AS 1.04 1.02 1.03 0.93 1.09 0.96 1.07 0.9
Valdres.Energiverk.AS 0.81 0.8 1.02 0.82 0.97 1.03 0.99 0.85
Varanger.Kraft.AS 1.45 1.32 1.1 1.32 1 1.12 0.98 1.48
Vesteralskraft.Nett.AS 1.13 1.13 1 1.17 0.96 0.99 1.02 1.16
Mgeom 0.97 1 0.97 1.02 0.98 0.95 1.02 0.97
Mavrg 0.98 1.02 0.97 1.04 0.99 0.96 1.02 0.98
SD 0.19 0.22 0.11 0.23 0.07 0.12 0.07 42.89
Min 0.66 0.74 0.7 0.7 0.84 0.66 0.87 0.91
Max 1.48 1.57 1.13 1.56 1.16 1.12 1.24 1.03
Table 6: Individual Malmquist-indices for the period 2001 to 2005
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B.3 1999 to 2005
1999 - 2005 CM OEC CTC TEC AEC TC PE IM
Alta.Kraftlag.AL 0.73 0.64 1.14 0.69 0.93 1.09 1.04 0.76
Askoy.Energi.AS 0.48 0.56 0.86 1.01 0.56 0.92 0.93 0.93
Bodo.Energi.AS 0.97 1.25 0.78 1.38 0.91 0.82 0.94 1.13
Dalane.Elverk 0.93 0.8 1.16 0.57 1.4 0.86 1.34 0.49
Eidefoss.AS 1.03 0.9 1.14 1.04 0.86 1.09 1.05 1.13
Elverum.Energiverk.Nett.AS 0.79 0.74 1.07 0.73 1 0.97 1.1 0.71
Fredrikstad.Energi.Nett.AS 0.58 0.72 0.8 0.7 1.04 0.85 0.95 0.59
Gudbrandsdal.Energi.AS 1.32 1.1 1.21 1.08 1.02 1.21 1 1.3
Hadeland.Energinett.AS 0.98 0.93 1.05 1.03 0.91 1.12 0.93 1.15
Hallingdal.Kraftnett.AS 1.13 1 1.13 1 1 1.09 1.04 1.09
Halogaland.Kraft.AS 0.84 0.72 1.17 0.75 0.96 1.21 0.96 0.9
Hammerfest.Elektrisitetsverk.DA 0.69 0.67 1.03 0.98 0.68 1.15 0.89 1.13
Haugaland.Kraft.AS 1.54 1.57 0.99 1.56 1 1.04 0.95 1.63
Helgeland.Kraftlag.AL 0.98 0.87 1.13 0.89 0.97 1.21 0.94 1.08
Klepp.Energi.AS 0.96 1.17 0.82 1 1.17 1.1 0.75 1.1
Lier.everk.AS 0.82 0.98 0.83 1 0.98 0.83 0.99 0.83
Lofotkraft.AS 0.62 0.55 1.13 0.78 0.71 1.21 0.94 0.94
Narvik.Energi.AS 0.89 1.1 0.81 1.39 0.79 0.85 0.94 1.19
Nordmore.Energiverk 1.06 1.01 1.05 1 1.01 1.07 0.98 1.07
Nord.Osterdal.Kraftlag.AL 1.13 1 1.14 1.01 0.99 1.12 1.02 1.12
Notodden.Energi.AS 0.75 0.73 1.02 0.83 0.89 0.96 1.06 0.8
Ringeriks.Kraft.AS 1.64 1.48 1.11 1.47 1 1.06 1.04 1.56
Stange.Energi.AS 1.4 1.32 1.06 1.25 1.06 1.1 0.97 1.37
Sunnfjord.Energi.AS 0.7 0.61 1.14 0.72 0.85 1.12 1.03 0.8
Tafjord.Kraftnett.AS 0.93 1.05 0.89 1.11 0.95 0.87 1.02 0.96
Trondheim.Energiverk.Nett.AS 0.78 1 0.78 1 1 0.74 1.05 0.74
Tussa.Nett.AS 0.82 0.76 1.08 0.79 0.97 1.03 1.05 0.81
Valdres.Energiverk.AS 0.96 0.86 1.11 0.81 1.06 1.15 0.96 0.94
Varanger.Kraft.AS 1.27 1.13 1.13 1.32 0.86 1.22 0.92 1.61
Vesteralskraft.Nett.AS 1.15 1.05 1.1 1.11 0.95 1.06 1.03 1.18
Mgeom 0.93 0.91 1.02 0.97 0.94 1.03 0.99 1
Mavrg 0.96 0.94 1.03 1 0.95 1.04 0.99 1.02
SD 0.27 0.26 0.14 0.25 0.15 0.14 0.09 19.24
Min 0.48 0.55 0.78 0.57 0.56 0.74 0.75 1.15
Max 1.64 1.57 1.21 1.56 1.4 1.22 1.34 0.87
Table 7: Malmquist-indices for the period 1999 to 2005
